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1. Introduc tion 
It was pointed out by G. Barnard et al. (1962) that if it were reported 
that a coin whose probability of heads is 8 came up heads t times and tails 
n- t times in a series of independent tosses that, irrespective of the stopping 
rule, the like lihood was 
and the likelihood principle would then dictate that any inference about 8 
should not depend on which stopping rule was actually used. Two common 
stopping rules are: (a) Fix the total number of tosses and observe the number 
of heads (binomial sampling); (b) Observe the total number of tosses required 
to attain a fixed number of heads (negative binomial sampling). 
In case (a) we have the sampling distribution of T the number of heads 
(2) 
In case (b) the sampling distribution of N the number of tosses required to 
obtain t heads, 
Pr(N=nlt) n=t,t,t+l, .. . (3) 
Now there are Bayesi ans who have developed rules for obtaining reference prior 
distributions which purport to express little or no inf ormation regarding the 
parameter 8 . Jeffreys (1961) invokes invariance; Box and Tiao (1973) recommend 
priors such t hat likelihoods are data translated in some sense ; Akaike (1978) 
and Geisser (1979) formulate procedures which involve the predictive distribu-
tion and Kullback- Leibler divergence measures whilst Bernardo (1979) uses the 
notion of maximizing entropy in the limit, and Zellner (1977) maximizes the 
Shannon information in the data relative to that of the prior . All of the above 
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methods with the exception of Geisser ' s and Zellner ' s yield the same reference 
prior 
PB(8) ~ 8- ½ (1- 8)-½ (4) 
f or the binomial and 
pN(8) ~ 8- l (1- 8) - ½ (5) 
for the negative binomial case. Hence the posterior densities for these two 
cases are 
pB ( S i t,n) ~ e t-½ (l- 6)n-t- ½ 
(6) 
pN(6i t , n ) ~ 8t-l (1- 8)n-t- ½ 
r espectivel y. Zellner ' s method leads to pr iors that differ from t he above and 
differ between themselves . Geisser ' s method does not provide un ique solutions 
in these cases . In fact for all these me t hods the prior distribution will 
depend on the sampling rule and consequent l y so will the pos t e r ior distribution 
(al though to a far lesser degree). Dependence on the sampling rule is defended 
by some Bayesians as can be adduced by the following quotes . 
Box and Tiao (1973 , p. 46) : "In general we feel that it is sensible to 
choose a noninformative prior which expresses ignorance relative to informa-
tion which can be s upplied by a particular experiment . If the experiment is 
changed, then the expression of relative ignorance can be expected to change 
correspondingly. " 
Akaike (1980, p . 147) : "The expec t ed behavior of the likelihood func tion 
is certainly different for the two schemes . .. and i t i s irrational (my 
emphas i s) to adop t one and the same prior distribution, irrespectively of the 
expected difference of the statistical behavior of the likelihood functions." 
+ 
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Bernardo (1979, p. 144): "Indeed, it is known that even from a purely 
personalistic point of view, one must integrate over the sample space to 
design an experiment. It does not seem unnatural to me that one has to do the 
same to analyze the implications of its results." 
Zellner (1977, p. 231) "Since the purpose of a MDIP [maximal data informa-
tion piror] is to allow the information provided by an experiment to be 
featured [in the posterior distribution], it seems natural that this form of 
a MDIP pdf that accomplishes this objective be dependent on the design of an 
experiment". 
Jeffreys, who suggested the use of the root of Fisher's expected informa-
tion as the prior density which several of the previously suggested methods 
reduce to in this case, interestingly enough appears to prefer a uniform prior 
on 0. He states (1961, p. 125) "Then there is no objection to the uniform 
distribution and no other ••• has been seriously suggested though there is 
something to be said for ••• [use of the square root of Fisher's expected 
information]. 
Although other Bayesians believe that the prior should not depend on 
the sampling distribution, which reflects the experiment, it is not incon-
ceivable that the experiment itself induce the paradigm involving the para-
meter. More importantly the parameter is very often an unobservable construct 
mainly devised to foster a model which facilitates the prediction of future 
observations> so that a prior for the parameter may be a matter of convenience. 
On the other hand, these general arguments for sampling 
dependent priors seem rather weak for this particular problem. We shall 
attempt in this paper to present an argument for a particular non-infor-
mative prior that adequately addresses the prediction problem and induces 
,. 
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a single prior for the various types of sampling as a consequence of a 
limiting argument. It turns out to be the uniform prior preferred by Bayes, 
Laplace and Jeffries when there is presumed to be no prior information. 
Ii 
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2 . The Uniform Prior - A Justification. 
Of course the posterior density for a uniform prior density p(0) = 1, 
i s 
I t n-t Pu(0 t,n) ~ 0 (1-0) 
If we now addend to this the further problem of trying to predict the 
tota l number of heads R including the t heads already sampled, 
in a total of M trials (n already sampled), we calculate the probabilities 
that R = r given Mand the alternative priors for 0: 
=~ 
M 
r=t, t +l, . .. , min(n, M- n+t) 
n 
PrN [R=r jM, n, t] = 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
where the non-integral combinatoric is defined in terms of gamma funct i ons. 
We now propose ano the r j ustificat ion for a uniform prior from the 
point of view of an urn with two t ypes of object s. 
Suppose we have an urn with a known number of M red and white balls (or 
marked heads and tails) of whi~n an unknown number R are r ed . The object is 
to infer R or equivalently R/M, since M is assumed known. 
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The urn may be sampled without replacement in a variety of ways . No 
matter what the sampling procedure, (except perhaps one that will exhaust the 
urn and here it is largely irrelevant) it seems illogical in this case to base a 
prior for R on the sampling procedure . Most rules f or determining so- called 
reference priors when only a finite number of alternative are assumed in the 
presence of little or no knowledge usually assign each alternative equal prior 
probability . We shall do so here. 
In the case of hypergeometric sampling we note that the chance of drawing 
t red balls out of the 
Pr[T=tln,B,R] 
n sampled i s 
_W~ 
(:) 
= 0, otherwise. 
t=0,l, ... , min(R , n) (11) 
For negative hypergeometric sampling i.e., sampling until t red balls are in 
hand and denoting N as the size, we obtain 
Pr[N=n Jt, M,R] = f or n=t , t +l, ... , min (M,t+M- R) . 
(12) 
= 0, other wise. 
Now,as already indicated,prior probabilities for a finite number of alterna-
tives are usually assumed equal when littl e is known beforehand, so that 
Pr[R=r iMJ = (M+l) - l. 
Consequently, since it i s an easy matter to check that the likelihood 
of R of (12) i s the same as in the previous case (11), then in either 
situation 
Pr [R=r IM ,n, t] = 
( r \ /M-r \ 
h}_~ 
(M+l) n+l 
= 0, otherwise . 
r=t, ... , min(M- n+t,n) 
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We also not~.that·for large M, 
Pr[T=tln,M,r] ~ 
Pr[N=nlt,M,R] • 
R • r(n+2) Pr{ - < z] = M- rCt:+l)r(n-t+l) 
- . 
(l--~- )n-t 
M-
(l- !_ )n-t 
M 
/z 
0 
dx 
As M grows and RM-l ~ 0 the 1.h.s. of (14), (15) and (16) tend to their 
I respective r. h. s. Further the limiting posterior density of -1 RM is the 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
· one given for 0 in (7) which emanates from the uniform prior and consequently 
differs from the posteriors recommended by most of the afrrrementioned Bayesians 
· for 0, with the exception of Bayes and Jeffries. When M is large inferences 
on the fraction R/M derived from (16) will not differ appreciably from in-
ferences using the posterior induced by the methods previously discussed unless 
n is very small. 
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3. Comments . 
In much scientific, technical and medical experimentation where individual 
trials are binary , the parametric Bernoulli model assuming independent copies with 
its resulting likelihood function (1) is used as a basis for the analysis of the 
data. Although this is a useful and convenient paradigm for this type of trial 
it is not as appropriate in most instances as one that assumes only a fini te 
number of trials can be made no matter how large . The first model assumes that 
there is some value 0 which is the probability of " success" on each individual 
trial while the second entertains the notion that from a number of binary 
events, either having occurred or that potentially can occur, a certain number are 
observed which are in no way distinguishable from the rest before being observed. 
The latter model actually can include the first even when the first has some 
l egitimat e claim to describe the process--such as repeated tossing of the same 
coin. We assume the tosses are generated so that there is a sequence of 
heads and tails and then some fraction of the sequence is observed. One of 
the advantages for a Bayesian for the second approach i s the greater simplicity 
(difficult though it is) in thinking about prior distributions for the observable 
quantities--say the number of heads out of the total rather than trying to 
focus on a distribution for values of 0 . 
The finite mode l that focuses on the fraction of successes in the finite 
population i s basically a dependent Bernoulli model which leads to the hyper-
geometric likelihood, common to the particular cases of (11) a nd (12), 
L(R) = R! (M-R) ! (R-t) ! (M-R-n+t) ! (17) 
Of course in many situations we are interested in the chance that the 
next observation is a success. This is acomplished by l etting M = t+l and is 
useful in de t ermining what the chances are that a therapy already given to n 
ailing people more or l ess simil ar to you and having "cur ed" t of them will 
.,i 
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also cure you of the ailment. A physician who wishes to know the chances that 
a particular fraction out of a given number say, M-n, that he is treating 
will be cured can calculate the chance that 
[ R-t ] Pr M-n ~ z (18) 
A pharmaceutical company or a government health organization may assume that 
the potential number of future cases is sufficiently large so that an 
asymptotic approximation is accurate enough to be adequately informed 
regarding the cure fraction of that finite, though not necessarily spec-
ified, number of these cases. 
Recently, Stigler (1981) has argued that Bayes, himself, in his 
famous Scholium had actually presented a predictive argument for his 
uniform prior, which had been misinterpreted by critics. Although 
the argument attributed to Bayes by Stigler differs: somewhat for that 
given here, it is tied together by the same predictive thread. 
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Box (1980) suggests a method for criticizing an entertained model 
consisting of data y , parameter se t 0 and assumptions A, whi ch is structured 
via the relationship, 
p(y, e IA) p (yl e , A) p(elA) . 
Here p(yle,A) is the joint probability . function of the observations gi ven 0 
and p(0IA) is the prior probability func tion of e . He notes 
that prior to the avail ability of the data one can compute 
p(yl A) = f p(yl e ,A) p( el A) dH 
which he denotes as the predictive (marginal) density of the data. This , 
he claims, enables one t o assess the credibility of the model fo r any ob-
served se t of da ta yd by r eferring to p(ydlA) or to the density p(g(yd) IA) 
of some predictive checking function g (yd). 
Basically he defines a t est with significance level 
to allow criticism . of the model. He illustrates the concept by presenting 
several useful examples. In this note we shall present two examples whi ch 
when taken in tandem throw some doubt on an uncritical use of this 
procedure. 
Assume an i.i . d . sequence of Bernoulli trials with probability e of success 
Suppose in this instance the prior denisty fo r e is actually assumed to be 
uniform as in Bayes ' original model. Then for a fixed number n of trials 
where y successes are observed, the predictive probability function of y 
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is easily calculated to be 
Pr(ylA) = _!_ 
n+l y=O, 1, ... , n. (1) 
Le. uniform for all admissible values of y. Hence no significance 
test of the type advocated by Box, 
(2) 
is available. Are we to conclude that Bayes' original model cannot be 
flawed? Or is it just that predictive model criticism fails here? 
Suppose now we had used negative binomial sampling so that we terminated 
the experiment as soon as y successes were attained and consequently 
observed n trials. Here the predictive probability function of the number 
of trials is 
Pr(N=n IA) = Y 
· n(n+l) n = y, y+l, •••• (3) 
The fact that the probability function is monotonically decreasing inn 
indicates that the Box procedure is workable i.e. if the observed N = n0 
is large enough relative toy, the model may be called into question. In 
fact, 
00 y V I: ---- =""""--=a, 
n(n+l) no 
n=no 
(4) 
where a.= 8, the MLE of 8. Are we then to conclude that predictive model 
criticism here succeeds only for small 8? Sampling until a fixed number of 
,. 
failures is attained results in criticism increasing withe. In either case 
what aspect of the model is called into question other than Bayes' uniform 
prior? And, what is the meaning of calling this into question? Box 
has made an elegant suggestion for the problem of model criticism, but 
it should, like most statistical techniques, be used with caution and care-
fully interpreted.within the context of its application. 
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